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The roles and responsibilities of air traffic controllers and pilots are shifting in the advent 
of the NextGen air traffic management infrastructure, which also involves high levels of 
automation. It is important to understand just how large departures from the current 
ingrained practices the NextGen procedures represent, particularly in extremely safety-
critical tasks such as airborne conflict resolutions. Pilots’ conflict resolution maneuver 
preferences have received some attention, but corresponding research on air traffic 
controllers’ practices is almost nonexistent. We analyzed 87 samples of aircraft track data 
involving conflict alerts and subsequent resolution maneuvers from Atlanta center. 
Vertical conflict resolution maneuvers were used in the majority of the cases examined. 
Within the vertical dimension, reductions of current vertical change (climb or descent) 
were collectively the most frequent resolution maneuver type, but descents were twice as 
frequent as climbs. Conflict resolution maneuvers furthermore do not seem to be 
independent from conflict geometries. 
 
 
The NextGen air traffic control (ATC) and -management (ATM) technologies and procedures will 
fundamentally change the roles of pilots and air traffic controllers as well as their tasks and task environments. The 
putative increases in the system capacity and efficiency will be achieved through extensive use of automation, 
including automated conflict alerting. Although there is already much experience of such systems in both ATC 
(Conflict Alert, or CA; Nolan, 1998) and in cockpits (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, or TCAS; 
Bliss, 2003; Chappell, 1990), procedures for shared conflict avoidance and resolution are still being designed. As 
researchers and designers consider the implications of these procedures, it is imperative that they remain harmonious 
with controllers’ current techniques of managing traffic and in particular with ingrained separation maneuvers used 
in response to potential midair conflicts. It is especially important to avoid generating pilots’ rules-of-the-road for 
self-separation, or automation-based conflict avoidance advisories that are at odds with current ATC conflict 
avoidance techniques. This paper describes an effort to determine the maneuver stereotypes of en route controllers' 
responses to conflict alerts in operational conditions. 
 
Pilots’ Maneuver Preferences 
 
A fair amount of research has been devoted to examining conflict resolution maneuver stereotypes among 
pilots (e.g., Alexander, Merwin, & Wickens, 2005: Thomas & Rantanen, 2006; Thomas & Wickens, 2008). This is 
primarily due to the criticality of collision-avoidance maneuvering in response to airborne collision detection 
systems (e.g., TCAS and Cockpit Display of Traffic Information, or CDTI), often under severe time constraints 
(seconds) and without coordination with ATC or other aircraft in the vicinity. Note, however, that TCAS always 
prescribes a maneuver, and it is assumed that if pilots respond at all, they will always comply in a vertical direction 
specified by the TCAS algorithm. This in contrast to the CDTI, where maneuver choice is up to the pilot as the 
direction of conflict resolution is not envisioned to be explicitly commanded by the automation. Research on CDTI 
generally reveals that pilots tend to prefer vertical maneuvers over lateral ones, reflecting perhaps the greater 
expediency and reduced complexity of such maneuvering (Thomas & Wickens, 2008). However the data are 
somewhat ambiguous regarding the extent to which the particular geometry of a conflict dictates the direction of a 
maneuver. Some faint trends were observed by Thomas and Wickens, revealing that head-on conflicts (versus 
crossing or overtaking) tended to induce relatively more lateral maneuvering. 
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Air Traffic Controllers’ Maneuver Preferences 
 
Investigation of conflict avoidance maneuver preferences among air traffic controllers is substantially more 
difficult than research on pilots’ preferences. There are several good reasons for the paucity of empirical research on 
this topic, many of which emphasize the differences between pilots’ and controllers’ tasks and task environments, 
even at the dawn of the era of distributed control and shared separation responsibility. The main difference between 
pilots’ and controllers’ separation responsibilities under mature free flight or NextGen operations is that pilots are 
primarily concerned about their own aircraft and their attention extends little beyond those other aircraft that pose an 
immediate or near-immediate threat of loss of separation. Air traffic controllers must concern themselves with the 
‘big picture’ and traffic flows rather than individual aircraft pairs. Their goal is to create conflict-free traffic flows 
such that they do not need to devote undue attention to individual conflicts. Also, controllers are always responsible 
for a much larger number of aircraft that any pilot in any situation, and effective management of their own workload 
is critical to their performance. However, the CA data examined here clearly represent exceptions to this general 
modus operandi and may reveal different conflict resolution patterns that are closer to pilots’ demonstrated 
preferences. 
 
There are very few laboratory studies on controllers’ conflict resolution maneuver preferences, and results 
from such settings must be evaluated against the particular experimental conditions and airspace designs. Rantanen, 
Yang, and Yin (2006) examined controllers’ separation preferences in a simulator study with a simplified airspace 
and traffic patterns. Vertical separation (i.e., commanding planes to climb or descend, or remain at an intermediate 
altitude) was much preferred over vectoring (lateral maneuvers). Controllers have also been shown to prefer the 
vertical dimension for separation in other contexts (Rantanen & Nunes, 2005). Vertical (altitude) or longitudinal 
(speed) maneuvers typically preserve traffic flows along regular routes and thus reduce the ‘problem space’ for the 
controller along those, simplifying their monitoring task. The maneuver preferences observed by Rantanen et al. 
(2006) undoubtedly reflect the very constrained and relatively small airspace used in the simulation with little room 
for vectoring (i.e., lateral maneuvering) and few opportunities for routing changes. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
In spite of the importance of this topic for aviation safety, and in particular for understanding how 
controller’s tendencies may either reinforce or contradict pilot tendencies, no data appear to exist regarding the 
actual controller conflict avoidance behavior with live traffic. The intent of this paper is to bring insight to this 
process, using the operational ATC en route data from controllers responding to conflict alerts at five Air Route 
Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), with emphasis on one large one (see Wickens et al., 2008 for details). Our focus 
is on two key aspects of the data: (1) what tendencies to controllers show in terms of instructing lateral versus 
vertical maneuvers, and, within the latter category, climbs vs. descents, and (2) how are these tendencies mediated 
or influenced by the particular geometry of a conflict. A third aspect of these data pertaining to how controller’s 
responses are mediated by alert reliability (e.g. false alert rate) is reported in detail by Wickens, Rice, Keller, 




This research was done on a subset of data from a greater research effort, involving a large set of conflict 
cases from five ARTCCs: Houston (ZHU), Indianapolis (ZID), Salt Lake City (ZLC), Los Angeles (ZLA), and 
Atlanta (ZTL). Much of the results reported in this paper is based only on the data from ZTL, which was the only 
center thus far receiving a geometry x maneuver contingency analysis. However, overall maneuver data 
(independent of contingency analysis) was available from all five centers, and are reported below. These data were 
originally provided to researchers at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical Center (Allendoerfer, 
Friedman-Berg, & Pai, 2007) for analysis, and to us by the FAA in cooperation with National Air Traffic Controllers 
Association (NATCA). Data for each aircraft pair in conflict consisted of predicted point of closest approach, time 
of alert, and the radar tracks and altitudes of the aircraft, allowing for analyses of the actual conflicts as they were 
played out (see Wickens et al., 2008, for details). Alas, these data could not be linked to voice transcripts for 
additional detail (see Allendoerfer et al., 2007).  
 
Each single conflict was defined as an encounter between two aircraft in a  pair, which triggered at least 
one CA (repeated CA onsets for a given encounter might occur as a given pair went in and out of conflict). For each 
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case, approximately six minutes’ worth of actual track data of the two aircraft in conflict were recorded; these track 
data included the x- and y- (latitude and longitude) and z-(altitude) coordinates sampled every 10 seconds. These 
coordinates were plotted separately for horizontal and vertical trajectories, from where the conflict geometries and 
maneuvers performed to resolve the conflict could be determined visually. The geometries were classified into three 
vertical and three horizontal categories; in addition, five classes of maneuvers were defined. 
 
Vertical geometry. The relative vertical behavior of the two aircraft in a pair prior to the alert was 
categorized as either converging vertically, where one aircraft was climbing and the other descending, or parallel 
climbs or descents, or both aircraft level.  
 
Lateral geometry. Aircraft trajectories in the horizontal plane were classified into three categories, either 
converging, diverging, or parallel. In the case of parallel tracks, one aircraft was often overtaking the other. Parallel 
approaching tracks (e.g., near opposite headings) were classified as 'converging'. Note that diverging lateral tracks 
could trigger a CA if these involved more rapid convergence on the vertical axis, such that an LOS on the altitude 
dimension (< 1000 ft) would occur before separation on the lateral dimension (5 miles) is obtained. Note also that 
vertical and lateral geometries were both applied to every conflict.  
 
Maneuvers. Maneuver type was subdivided into five classes: descend, reduce descent for an aircraft already 
in descent (e.g., a level off of a descending aircraft), climb, reduce climb, and turn. Either an increase descent or 
increase climb was simply categorized as a descent or climb, respectively. In the case of joint maneuvers in both the 
lateral and vertical axes, the CA was assigned to the category of that maneuver which occurred first (earliest). We 
also reiterate that inferences of an instructed maneuver were made solely from trajectory changes following the CA, 
since we had no direct access to corresponding voice transcripts (but see Allendoerfer et al., 2007; Friedman-Berg, 




The maneuvers controllers instructed in response to the impending conflict or as prompted by the CA, as 
inferred from the aircraft trajectory plots, are depicted in Table 1. A χ2 goodness-of-fit test on all maneuvers across 
the five centers (with a null hypothesis of equal proportions of maneuvers) showed significant differences between 
the five classes of maneuvers, χ2(4, N = 277) = 60.38, p < .001.  
 
Although turns constitute the most frequent single category (36%), these lateral maneuvers occurred much 
less frequently than those involving vertical trajectory change. This vertical maneuver domination was similar to 
that observed in the previous report and is also consistent with the integrated findings of studies of aircraft (e.g., 
pilot initiated) conflict avoidance (Thomas & Wickens, 2008).  
 
Descents were commanded twice as frequently as climbs (7% vs. 14%), but modifications to vertical 
transitions already in progress were equally divided between reductions of climbs and reductions of descents. 
Collectively, the latter were the most frequent maneuvers. These trends may reflect controllers’ concern of the 
overall fuel efficiency of flights; descending an aircraft is much more fuel efficient than climbing the aircraft beyond 
its planned altitude, and reductions to climbs and descents already in progress are minimally disruptive to pilots.  
 
Table 1. Maneuver frequencies across five ARTCCs from where conflict resolution data were obtained. 
 
 Maneuver 
Center Climb Descend Reduce Climb Reduce Desc. Turn All 
ZID 3 (3.37%) 24 (26.97%) 22 (24.72%) 14 (15.73%) 26 (29.21%) 89 
ZHU 1 (3.70%) 2 (7.41%) 8 (29.63%) 3 (11.11%) 13 (48.15%) 27 
ZLA 3 (5.88%) 4 (7.84%) 10 (19.61%) 4 (7.84%) 30 (58.82%) 51 
ZLC 3 (13.64%) 1 (4.55%) 7 (31.82%) 9 (40.91%) 2 (9.09%) 22 
ZTL 11 (12.50%) 9 (10.23%) 10 (11.36%) 30 (34.09%) 28 (31.82%) 88 
All 21 (7.58%) 40 (14.44%) 57 (20.58%) 60 (21.66%) 99 (35.74%) 277 
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Our in-depth analysis of contingency between geometry and maneuver was carried out only on 97 CA 
cases from ZTL. For nine of these there was no maneuver, suggesting that these were false alarms. This roughly 
10% non-response rate parallels that reported in the full data set of 497 CA’s; the reasons for this are discussed in 
the Wickens et al. (2009) paper in this volume. Given that the remaining 89 cases involved CA, we expected that 
most aircraft trajectories would converge. Indeed, a total of 71 aircraft pairs were on either horizontally or vertically 
converging trajectories and 54 were converging both horizontally and vertically. Conflict resolution maneuvers were 
more evenly distributed among the maneuver classes. In the majority of cases, controllers either restricted an 
aircraft’s climb (N = 30) or turned the aircraft (N = 28). These data are consistent with the full analysis of the larger 
5-center data set, which revealed that vertical maneuvers dominated turns and within the former, reduced climbs 
were the most prevalent. In particular maneuvers exploiting gravity (reduced climbs and descents) dominated those 
opposing gravity (climbs and reduced descents) by a ratio of over 2:1. 
 
Contingency Between Geometry and Maneuver Types.  
 
We have discussed the ‘main effects’ of maneuver type and geometry above (e.g., analyzing the frequency 
of these categories, independent of the other). Here we focus our discussion on the interaction, or contingencies 
between the geometry, as perceived by controllers on their display, and the types of maneuvers that were instructed. 
We examined these contingencies by χ2  tests for independence. Two contingency tables were created for vertical 
and lateral geometries and corresponding maneuvers and their combinations. To create these tables we used the 
three vertical conflict geometry classes and collapsed maneuver classes also into three: turn, [climb or reduce 
descent], and [descent or reduce climb], for a 3 x 3 table. The rationale for collapsing within the vertical maneuvers 
was the commonality of the two that worked against gravity, and the two that worked with gravity, as described 
above.  
 
The results for the vertical geometries approached significance, χ2(4, N = 87) = 8.67, p = .069. The cause of 
this non-independence is apparent from the data in Table 2; while climbs and reduced descents made up 
approximately 22% of all maneuvers, these were particularly unlikely to occur in converging vertical geometries (N 
= 8; 14% of the time). They were also overall disproportionately rarer than other maneuvers, possibly reflecting their 
fuel inefficiency and disruptive nature for pilots. 
 
Table 2. Counts of different maneuvers by vertical conflict geometries (expected values in parentheses). 
 
 Maneuver  
Vertical Geo. Climb  Desc.  Turn  Total 
Converging 8 (13.333) 28 (26.00) 22 (18.667) 58 
Level 4 (2.299 ) 4 (4.483) 2 (3.218) 10 
Parallel 8 (4.368) 7 (8.517) 4 (6.115) 19 
Total 20  39  28  87 
 
Similarly, three horizontal geometries (converging, diverging, and parallel) were analyzed against the 
aforementioned three maneuver categories in another 3 x 3 table (Table 3 below). The results were not significant, 
χ2(4, N = 86) = 3.72, p = .44, but there appears to be a certain degree of dependence between lateral geometry and 
maneuver tendencies. Turns were much more frequent in converging than in parallel geometries (35% vs. 20%). In 
both of these analyses some very small expected values (< 5) are noteworthy. 
 
Table 3. Maneuver counts by horizontal conflict geometries (expected values in parentheses). 
 
 Maneuver  
Horizontal Geo. Climb  Desc.  Turn  Total 
Converging 15 (14.419) 25 (28.116) 22 (19.465) 62
Diverging 0 (0.930) 3 (1.814) 1 (1.256) 4 
Parallel 5 (4.651) 11 (9.069) 4 (6.279) 20
Total  20  39  27  86
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We performed one more analysis on combinations of vertical and horizontal geometries (converging—
converging, converging—nonconverging, nonconverging—converging, and nonconverging —nonconverging) 
against the aforementioned three maneuver categories in a 4 x 3 table (see Table 4 below). The test for non-
independence was significant, χ2(6, N = 86) = 13.43, p = .036. Turns, representing only 31% of the maneuvers 
overall, were disproportionately more frequent on geometries with convergence in both axes  (40%). Here, we 
encountered some very small expected values. 
 
Table 4. A contingency table for combinations of vertical and horizontal conflict geometries and corresponding 
resolution maneuvers (expected values in parentheses). 
 
 Maneuver  
Vertical, Horizontal Geometry Climb  Desc.  Turn  Total 
Converging—Converging 7 (10.93) 21 (21.31) 19 (14.76) 47 
Converging—Nonconverging 1 (2.33) 7 (4.53) 2 (3.14) 10 
Nonconverging—Converging 8 (3.49) 4 (6.80) 3 (4.71) 15 
Nonconverging—Nonconverging 4 (3.26) 7 (6.35) 3 (4.40) 14 




In ATC workload management is one of the most critical skills for a successful controller. Consequently, 
controllers’ techniques exhibit certain economy. For example, maintenance of traffic flows is less mentally taxing 
than keeping track of individual aircraft, and vertical maneuvering is less disruptive to traffic flows than lateral 
maneuvering. Hence, our results are not entirely surprising: vertical conflict resolution maneuvers (climb, descend, 
restrict climb or descent) were used in the majority of the cases we have examined. Such maneuvers are often the 
best solutions to conflicts, especially if the aircraft involved are already in vertical transition. Indeed, reductions of 
current vertical change (climb or descent) were collectively the most frequent resolution maneuver type. On the 
other hand, climbs and restricted climbs were the least frequent maneuvers overall in all of our analyses, reflecting 
the disruptive nature and fuel inefficiency of such maneuvers working against gravity. In the few conflict geometries 
where they were used in the majority of cases, the difference to other maneuver types was very small. Within the 
vertical dimension, descents that exploit gravity were twice as frequent as the climbs that oppose it. 
 
We also discovered some indications that conflict resolution maneuvers are not independent from conflict 
geometries preceding them. Climbs or restricted descents were disproportionately rare in vertically converging 
geometries, while turns, despite their overall small proportion were frequently employed in resolution of conflicts 
with converging geometries. We expect these trends to become more salient when the full data set from all five 
ARTCCs is analyzed, and in much greater detail than was possible here. 
 
It should be kept in mind that 86 cases is not a very large data set when it is divided into 9 or 12 cells in 
contingency tables. However, the trends apparent in the raw numbers are quite clear and robust. The results reported 
here are only the first fruits of a continuing research effort, however. We are performing similar analyses on the data 
from all five centers, and expect to gain a much more detailed insights into controllers’ maneuver choices as well as 
statistically more significant results than here, with only about 20% of the data analyzed. Categorical analysis is 
common and undeniably valuable way to examine safety data, but its limitations must be acknowledged. Conflict 
geometries exhibit enormous variability and any classification system necessarily includes very different situations 
warranting different maneuver choices into the same categories. While this will be less of a problem with the full, 5-
center data set, we are also going to treat geometries as a continuous variable allowing more fine-grained 
measurement of their characteristics. 
 
Finally, we would like to make a case for detailed analysis of operational data, which can reveal patterns 
and behaviors that could never emerge in simulated laboratory experiments. Routine access to data such as reported 
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